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Abstract 
Using a horizontally differentiated three-firm model, we consider horizontal merger and 
antitrust policy in a network products market, where we observe network externalities 
and compatibilities (interconnectivities) between products and services. In particular, if 
the degree of network compatibilities in the case of a merger is sufficiently larger than 
that of product substitutability, consumer surplus is larger than in the premerger case. 
Thus, the proposed merger is allowed by antitrust authorities based on the positive 
effect on consumer surplus. In this case, the merger is Pareto improving. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the 1990s, waves of domestic and global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have 
been observed in various industries, including telecommunications, internet businesses, 
banking, airlines, and railways.1  These industries are commonly characterized as 
network product markets where we observe network externalities and compatibilities 
(interconnectivities) between products and services. In a seminal paper, Economides 
and White (1994) demonstrate the parallels between the concepts of compatibility and 
networks and those of complementarity, and then apply the analysis to antitrust policy. 
In this paper, focusing on the role of network compatibilities as merger efficiencies, we 
consider horizontal mergers and associated policy. 
There is a consensus that market concentration through M&A or collusive 
agreements reduces social welfare and thus should be forbidden. That is, horizontal 
mergers are likely to reduce consumer surplus and thus social welfare, even though they 
increase the merged firms’ profits. This is not allowed from an antitrust and competition 
policy perspective. In other words, from an antitrust perspective, the worrying cases are 
                                                  
1 For example, Breinlich, et al. (2017) surveyed international aspects of merger policy. 
Furthermore, di Giovanni (2005) empirically analyzed the relationship between 
cross-border M&A activity and financial deepening. 
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issues and welfare-reducing mergers.2 
However, it has been known in the field of industrial organization that market 
concentration by horizontal mergers does not necessarily worsen market performance. 
That is, mergers can increase market power and also create efficiencies.3 As shown in 
the “Williamson trade-off” (Williamson, 1968), a merger assessment requires to the 
trade-off of welfare-reducing price effects against welfare-increasing gains in 
productive efficiency. In particular, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) consider the welfare 
effects of horizontal mergers, assuming scale economies, synergies, and supply-side 
externalities (e.g., cost-saving) as merger efficiencies. For example, by combining their 
assets, the merging firms can operate at a lower unit cost. Thus, if the efficiency gains 
from the merger are sufficiently large, it is welfare improving. 
As mentioned above, to consider horizontal mergers and their effects in this paper, 
we assume the impacts of merger-related synergies on the demand-side in a network 
products market, i.e., the effects of network externalities and compatibilities 
(interconnectivities). For example, Farrell and Shapiro (2001) use improved 
interoperability and network configuration as hypothetical examples of mergers with 
synergies. Researches have considered horizontal mergers and associated policy in 
                                                  
2 However, Salant et al. (1983) demonstrate that horizontal mergers decrease the profits 
of participating firms compared with the premerger situation, i.e., merger paradox. 
3 See Perry and Porter (1985) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990). 
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airline networks (e.g., Brueckner & Spiller, 1991; Encaouna et al.,1996; Bilptkach & 
Hüschelrath, 2012; Hüschelrath & Müller, 2014). 
Furthermore, it is important to investigate the policy implications of merger control 
in a network products market. As explained by Shapiro and Varian (1999, pp. 304–305), 
the US Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted an extensive review of the proposed 
WorldCom–MCI merger in Internet and long-distance telephone services. Furthermore, 
both the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are unlikely to challenge 
mergers in high-technology industries because of low entry barriers in the rapidly 
changing environments. However, they do not allow proposed mergers in the software 
industry. They recognize that entry may be difficult in this industry where there are high 
consumer switching costs and intellectual property rights of the incumbents.4 Related to 
this issue, following Faulhaber (2002) and Gandal (2002), we examine the external 
effect of a merger on the outsider (nonparticipant) firm as an application of our model. 
   As will be shown below, we appreciate that introducing a common standard to make 
products and services compatible (interoperable) is an important consideration with 
network externalities; therefore, with respect to collusive behavior of merging firms, we 
make the specific assumption that the merging firms upgrade the level of compatibility 
                                                  
4 See also Spulber (2002, pp. 502–505). 
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(interoperability) compared with the case of noncooperative competition. Consequently, 
we demonstrate that a welfare-improving merger arises in the market if the net degree of 
network compatibilities in the merger case is sufficiently large. 
   In the next section, we first develop a horizontally differentiated three-firm model 
with network externalities and compatibilities. Second, we show the noncooperative 
Cournot equilibrium as the premerger case and then the equilibrium in the merger case. 
In Section 3, we first show the equilibrium outcomes, i.e., quantities, consumer surplus, 
and profits, in the merger case compared with the premerger case. Second, we consider 
horizontal mergers and associated policy from a consumer surplus perspective. Third, as 
an application of merger control, we examine the American Online (AOL)–Warner case. 
Finally, in Section 4, we summarize our main results and present some remaining 
problems. 
 
 
2. The Horizontally Differentiated Three-Firm Model with Network Externality 
 
2.1 Preliminary 
We develop a three-firm (product)  kji ,,  model in a network industry where each 
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firm provides a single horizontally differentiated product with a network externality. 
Applying the frameworks of Economides (1996) and Häckner (2000), we assume a 
linear inverse demand function of firm i’s product as follows: 
),( eiiii SNQqAp                                   (1) 
where kji qqQ   is the sum of the rival firms’ output, A  is the intrinsic market 
size, iq  is the output of firm i, and  1,0  represents the degree of product 
substitutability. In other words, 1  represents the degree of product differentiation. 
Given equation (1), )( eiSN  is a network externality function of ,
e
iS  which 
represents the expected network size of firm i’s product. We assume a liner network 
externality function;   ,eiei nSSN   where  1,0n  represents the degree of network 
externality. Furthermore, the expected network size of product i is given by: 
,eih
e
i
e
i QqS    ,, MCh                                  (2) 
where ek
e
j
e
i qqQ   is the sum of the rival firms’ expected outputs,  1,0h  is the 
degree of product i’s compatibility (interconnectivity) with the other firms’ product –i, 
subscript C denotes the case of noncooperative Cournot competition, i.e., premerger, 
and subscript M denotes the case of a merger. 
In considering the concept of a fulfilled expectation, following Katz and Shapiro 
(1985) and Economides (1996), we assume that consumers form expectations regarding 
network sizes before firms’ output decisions. Thus, when deciding the outputs, the 
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expected network sizes are given for the firms. 
For the following analysis, we make some important assumptions: 
 
Assumptions 
(i) 01   where .CM    
(ii) .n  
(iii) .1  n  
 
Assumption (i) implies that the degree of compatibility between insider firms’ 
products in the merger is larger than that in the premerger. This implies efficiency gains 
from merger-related synergies for network compatibilities.5 Assumption (ii) implies a 
stronger network externality. Assumption (iii) implies that the own-price effect exceeds 
the cross-price effect at the fulfilled expectation equilibrium.6 In other words, because 
Assumption (iii) can be rewritten as ,1 n  the left-hand side measures the degree 
of product differentiation. Thus, the degree of network externality is lower than that of 
product differentiation. 
                                                  
5 We assume nil or negligible costs to increase the level of compatibility among the 
merging firms. 
6 ,1  



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p
q
p  at ,i
e
i qq   .iei QQ    
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   Furthermore, we assume that production costs are zero. For example, we readily 
observe low and even negligible marginal production costs in telecommunications and 
Internet businesses. 
 
2.2 Premerger: Noncooperative Cournot competition 
We consider the initial situation (premerger) where three firms compete on quantities à 
la Cournot in the market. Based on equation (1), the profit function of firm i is given by: 
  .)( ieiiii qSNQqA                                 (3) 
The first-order condition (FOC) of profit-maximization is 
.0)(2 


e
iiiii
i
i SNQqAqp
q
                     (4) 
At a fulfilled expectation, i.e., ,i
e
i qq   ,jej qq   and ,kek qq   based on equations (2) 
and (4), we obtain: 
.0)()2(  iCi QnqnA                              (5) 
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., ,Ckji qqqq   we derive the following 
fulfilled expectation Cournot equilibrium. 
.
)(22 C
C nn
Aq                                     (6) 
Because it holds that ,CC qp   based on equation (4), the profit in the premerger 
case is expressed as:   .2CC q  
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2.3 Horizontal merger 
We consider the case of horizontal merger where a merger takes place between two 
firms in the market. Without loss of generality, we assume that there is an insider (I), 
providing two products  ji,  and an outsider (O), providing one product k . 
The aggregate profit of the insider under the merger (M) is expressed as: 
    .)()( jejjjieiii
jiM
qSNQqAqSNQqA 

 

          (7) 
Furthermore, the profit of the outsider is given by: 
  .)( kekkkO qSNQqA                               (8) 
   Based on equations (7) and (8), the FOCs for the insider and outsider are 
respectively given by:  
,0)(22 
 e
ikjijii
i
M SNqqqAqqp
q
          (9) 
,0)(2 


e
kkkkk
k
O SNQqAqp
q
                  (10) 
where we can obtain a similar FOC to equation (9) with respect to product j. 
At a fulfilled expectation, i.e., ,i
e
i qq   ,jej qq   and ,kek qq   in view of 
equations (2), (9), and (10), we have the following equations. 
,0)()2()2(  kCjMi qnqnqnA                 (11) 
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.0)()2(  kCk QnqnA                            (12) 
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., Iji qqq   and  ,Ok qq   equations (11) 
and (12) can be rewritten as: 
     ,022  OCIM qnqnnA                   (13) 
    .022  ICO qnqnA                            (14) 
Thus, we derive the following fulfilled expectation equilibrium at the merger. 
,)(2 A
D
nnq CI
                                   (15) 
  ,)(2 A
D
nnnq CO
                          (16) 
where        .02222 2  CM nnnnD   
   Based on equations (15) and (16), we derive the following relationship: 
.)(0)(   n
D
nqq OI                       (17) 
where n  denotes the net degree of network compatibilities. Equation (17) shows that 
if the net degree of network compatibilities is larger (smaller) than the degree of product 
substitutability, the output per insider firm is larger (smaller) than that of the outsider. In 
this case, if ,n  then the merger increases the outputs and prices of the insider 
compared with those of the outsider. Because it holds that    II qp  1  and 
,OO qp   the profit per insider firm is larger than that of the outsider: 
     .1 22 OOII qq    Otherwise, the merger reduces the outputs of the insider, 
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whereas it may or not increase the prices of the insider compared with the price of the 
outsider. Thus, the effect on the profits is ambiguous. 
In general, we obtain the following relationship for the profits:  
     .0)(211)(   nnn COI      (18) 
Given equation (18), even with ,n  the profit per insider firm can be larger than 
that of the outsider.7 
 
 
3. The Analysis  
 
3.1 The effects of horizontal merger 
3.1.1 Outputs 
From equations (6), (15), and (16), with respect to the outputs per firm in the merger 
                                                  
7 Equation (18) can be rewritten as follows: 
      ,0)(,,1)(  nCMIOCIOOI   
where       01221  IO  and   .1
11,,
C
M
CMIO 
 
  
Thus, if   ,0,,   CMIO  e.g., ,01  CM   it holds that .OI    Conversely, 
if   ,0,,   CMIO  e.g., ,CM    we derive the following relationship:   ,)(,,)( nCMIOOI    
where        .0,,1,, 
 

CMIOC
IO
CMIO   
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compared with those in the premerger, we obtain the following: 
  
  ,22
2
C
CI nnD
Annqq 


                            (19) 
  
  ,22 C
C
CO nnD
Annqq 


                            (20) 
Thus, we derive the following Lemma1: 
 
Lemma 1 
(i) .)()(  nqq CI  
(ii)    .0)()(  nnqq CCO   
 
In view of equations (5) and (11), if ,)(  Cn  then the strategic relationship for 
the outsider (or competition firm k) is complementary (substitutionary). Similarly for 
the outsider firm k, in view of equation (12), if ,)(  Cn  the strategic relationship 
for the insider firm i (and j) is complementary (substitutionary). Furthermore, if 
,)( n  then the reaction curve of the insider firm i shifts upward (downward) 
compared with the premerger case. Thus, the insider firm has an incentive to increase 
(decrease) output. 
If n  and , Cn  the merger increases the outputs of the insider and 
outsider firms compared with those in the premerger case. However, if , Cn  then 
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the merger increases the output of the insider firm while it decreases the output of the 
outsider firm compared with those in the premerger case. 
Conversely, if n  and , Cn  the merger increases the output of the 
outsider while it decreases that of the insider compared with those in the premerger case. 
This is the same well-known result found in previous studies on horizontal merger 
without network externalities. However, if , Cn  then the merger decreases the 
outputs of the insider and outsider firms compared with those in the premerger case. 
 
3.1.2 Consumer surplus 
Consumer surplus in the cases of a merger and a premerger are as follows: 
    22
2
121 OOIIM qqqqCS    and     .2
213 2
CC qCS
  Thus, with respect 
to the difference in consumer surplus between the cases of a merger and a premerger, 
i.e., the effect of a merger on consumer surplus, we derive the following relationships: 
              ,
2
121 22222 COCOICICMM qqqqqqqCSCSCS     (20) 
Using equations (19) and (20), we derive the following Lemma 2: 
 
Lemma 2 
If ,)( n  it holds that .0)( MCS  
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Proof. See Appendix. 
 
The condition for Lemma 2 can be rewritten as: .)()(   CM nnn  
That is, if the level of network compatibilities in the merger, i.e., ,Mn  is sufficiently 
large, then the merger increases consumer surplus compared with the premerger case. In 
this case, even if the output of the outsider decreases, because an increase in the outputs 
of the insider is sufficiently large, as a result, consumer surplus increases compared with 
the premerger case.8 Otherwise, the opposite case arises. For example, Hüschelrath and 
Müller (2014) show that mergers in airline networks increase consumer welfare. 
 
3.1.3 Profits 
To compare the profit a firm in the merger case to that in the premerger case, we define 
the difference in the profits between them as follows:  CIM   2  and 
.COO    In this case, taking equations (6), (15), and (16), we have the 
following Lemma 3: 
 
                                                  
8 With respect to total outputs in the merger case compared with the premerger case, 
using equations (19) and (20), we have the following relationship: 
    .)(0)(2)(  nqqqqQQ COCICM  
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Lemma 3 
(i)            .0)(222211 )(0)(     nnnnnn CCCIM  
(ii)    .0)()(0)(   nn CCOO  
 
In view of Lemma 4 (i), if ,n  i.e., the reaction curve of the insider shifts 
upward, then the merger increases the profit per insider firm compared with the 
premerger case. This is because, as in Lemma 1, the output and price of the insider 
increase compared with those in the premerger case.  
Contrarily, if ,n  although the output in the merger case decreases, i.e., 
,IC qq   the price may rise, compared with those in the premerger case. In particular, if 
,0 ICI qqq  then it holds that .CI pp   Otherwise, the profit in the merger case 
is lower than the profit in the premerger case, i.e., an unprofitable merger. In other 
words, it is a necessary condition for the merger paradox that .n  
Furthermore, with respect to Lemma 4 (ii), if either n  and  Cn  or  
n  and , Cn  then the merger increases the profit of the outsider.9 The former 
case corresponds to efficiency from merger-related synergies for network 
                                                  
9 Gugler and Szücs (2016) use datasets from the European Commission and find 
positive merger externalities. 
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compatibilities. The latter is the same as the case without network externalities.  
However, if either Cnn    or ,Cnn    the profit of the outsider 
decreases compared with the premerger case. For the former case, because the level of 
network compatibility of the insider is sufficiently large while that of the outsider is 
small, the output and price of the outsider decrease with increased output of the insider 
because of strategic substitutes. For the latter case, the profit of the outsider decreases 
with decreasing output of the insider because of strategic complements. The AOL–Time 
Warner case is an example of the former case. 
 
3.2 Antitrust policy and the evaluation of horizontal merger 
As mentioned in the Introduction, i.e., “Williamson trade-off,” the evaluation of 
proposed horizontal mergers involves the following two factors: mergers may increase 
market concentration whereas they may create efficiencies. We know that there are 
various evaluation rules and merger controls used by antitrust authorities. In particular, 
there has been considerable debate concerning whether consumer surplus or social 
(total) surplus should be the criteria used by the antitrust authorities.10 
For example, based on the three-firm model in this paper, social surplus in the 
                                                  
10 See Farrell and Katz (2006) and Heyer (2006). Because this issue is beyond the 
scope of this paper, we do not consider it in detail. 
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merger case is given by: ,OMMM CSW   where .2 IM   Thus, the welfare 
change induced by a merger can be expressed as: ,OMMM CSW   
where ,CMM CSCSCS   ,2 CIM    and .COO   Given the 
profitable merger, i.e., ,0M  if the antitrust authorities use the social surplus 
standard, the merger will be allowed, i.e., .0 MW 11 In this case, the condition 
0 OMMM CSW   is not necessary if 0M  is sufficiently large. 
Furthermore, even if it holds that ,0 OMCS   it is possible that 
.0 MO CS  This implies that social surplus increases through a merger if the 
increase in producer surplus is sufficiently large, i.e., 0M  and ,0 O  even 
though consumer surplus decreases. In this case, if the antitrust authorities approve the 
proposed merger, based on the social surplus standard, this decision may not be 
preferable for consumers. 
   In this paper, following Neven and Röller (2005) and Nocke and Whinston (2010, 
2013), we use the consumer surplus standard.12 For example, Neven and Röller (2005) 
consider three related parties: consumers, merging (insider) firms, and nonmerging 
                                                  
11 The points plotted, i.e., B and C, lie in the northeast half-plane in Figure 1 in Farrell 
and Shapiro (1990, p. 117). 
12 As mentioned by Nocke and Whinston (2010, 2013), antitrust authorities apply a 
consumer surplus standard to merger approval decisions in the US and to legal regimes 
in the EU, e.g., the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the DOJ and FTC. 
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(outsider) firms. In particular, consumers do not lobby antitrust authorities because they 
may not be informed about the consequences of proposed mergers and because they 
may incur prohibitive costs in representing their interests. Furthermore, in Section 3.3, 
we consider a case in which a proposed merger may affect the interests of an outsider 
firm negatively. 
Therefore, we assume that antitrust authorities will allow a proposed merger if and 
only if it holds that .0 MCS  This criterion is more restrictive than that based on a 
social surplus standard, i.e., .0 MW  
   In view of Lemma 2 and 3 (i), if it holds that ,n  the proposed merger satisfies 
not only the consumer surplus criteria, but also the profitability of the merger. We note 
that, given equation (18), the merger is internally sustainable among the insider firms 
because they do not have an incentive to be an outsider.13 Furthermore, with respect to 
the external effect on the profits of the outsider, based on Lemma 3 (ii), if it holds that 
, Cn  then the merger increases the profit of the outsider compared with that in the 
                                                  
13 To confirm that the merger is externally sustainable, we should examine whether the 
outsider providing product  k  has an incentive to be merged into the existing merger 
providing products  ji,  and whether the profits of the existing insider firms do not 
decrease if the outsider is merged. Thus, if the outsider has an incentive to be merged 
and the profits of the insider firms do not fall, a multiproduct monopoly providing three 
products  kji ,,  arises in the market. However, this is an issue for future research. 
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premerger case, i.e., positive merger externalities.14 As a result, under these conditions, 
social surplus increases. Let us summarize the result as Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition: The welfare-improving merger 
If the degrees of network compatibilities are sufficiently larger than that of product 
substitutability, i.e., ,  CCM nnn  then the proposed horizontal merger 
increases consumer surplus, profits, and thus social surplus compared with the 
premerger case. 
 
   However, we assume that these products are incompatible in the premerger case, i.e., 
.0C  In this case, because it holds that , Cn  the external effect on the profit of 
the outsider is negative, based on Lemma 3 (ii). Thus, the outsider firm has an incentive 
to bring a case to the court. In addition, considering the judgement of the case, the 
antitrust authorities may not allow the proposed merger. Although the proposed merger 
itself is preferable for consumers as well as the corresponding firms, it could be rejected 
by the antitrust authorities affected by the lobbying of the outsider firm. In the next 
section, as an application of our model, we consider the problem related to this case. 
                                                  
14 See Gugler and Szücs (2016) for an empirical analysis of merger externalities. 
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3.3 Application: The AOL–Time Warner case 
As mentioned above, related to the case where a merger reduces the profit of the 
outsider compared with the premerger case, we apply our model to the AOL–Time 
Warner case as an example. Although Faulhaber (2002) examines the AOL–Time 
Warner case in detail, in this paper, we cite the following description in Gandal (2002, p. 
87) about how network effects affect merger policy: 
“One of the main concerns of the regulatory agencies, i.e., FTC and the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), was interoperability or compatibility 
between AOL’s instant-messaging (IM) services and those of competitors. 
Although AOL offered a basic IM service before the proposed merger, merging IM 
services require broadband capabilities. AOL gained significant broadband 
capabilities with its acquisition of Time Warner. Hence, the FCC imposed the 
conditions that AOL must offer an interoperability with other providers of 
advanced IM services before it is allowed to offer such services itself.” 
Using our model, we will try to interpret the case cited above. Assuming that the level 
of compatibility of the outsider can be expressed as ,O  we derive the following 
output of the outsider at the equilibrium under the merger: 
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               (21) 
Furthermore, with respect to the profit of the outsider compared with the premerger case, 
we obtain the following: 
         .0)(2)(  OMCCOOCO nnnnn      (22) 
Initially, we assume that .CO    In this case, Lemmas 3 (ii) holds. That is, 
equation (22) can be rewritten as follows:  
   .0)()(  nn CCO                      (23) 
Now, based on the rule of the consumer surplus standard, i.e., ,0 MCS  the 
regulatory agencies allow the proposed merger if it satisfies the condition that the 
insider must offer interoperability with the outsider competitors (e.g., the other 
providers), as cited in italic above. In this situation, it holds that .n  In addition, 
let us assume that if the insider firm does not offer interoperability with the outsider 
firm, its profit decreases, i.e., .CO    This implies that, in view of Lemma 3 (ii) and 
equation (23), it holds that .Cn   That is, as mentioned in Section 3.2, because it 
holds in this situation that n  and ,Cn   negative merger externalities arise. 
Following the condition imposed by the regulatory agencies, if the insider firm 
offers the same level of interoperability (compatibility) as that of the insider to the 
outsider, i.e., ,MO    based on equation (22), we obtain the following: 
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      .02   CCMMCO nnnn       (24) 
Therefore, because the profit of the outsider firm increases compared with the 
premerger case, the proposed merger can be allowed by the regulatory agencies. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Horizontal merger leads to monopolization and market concentration and various 
efficiencies are also created. In this paper, focusing on the role of network externalities 
and compatibilities, i.e., network compatibility (connectivity), we considered a 
horizontal merger and associated merger policy in a network products market. In 
particular, based on the model where participating firms cooperatively increase the level 
of compatibility (interconnectivity) between their products, we demonstrated that a 
social welfare-improving merger can arise in an oligopolistic industry, if the degree of 
network compatibilities of the products is sufficiently large. 
   Although we have used a consumer surplus standard as a criterion for evaluating a 
proposed merger, there are various criteria for judging planned mergers, e.g., 
Herfindahl–Herschman Index and an upward price pressure Index. Relating to the latter 
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index, we have assumed a zero marginal cost of production in our model. That is，
because we have focused on the efficiency gains on the demand-side such as a rising 
level of network compatibilities by mergers, we have not dealt with efficiency gains on 
the supply-side such as cost savings (decreasing marginal costs). Thus, in our model, 
horizontal mergers increase not only prices but also outputs. However, considering 
efficiency gains on both the supply-side and demand-side, we can demonstrate that 
horizontal mergers decrease prices but increase outputs. This is because horizontal 
mergers shift the demand curve upward whereas they shift the marginal cost curve 
downward simultaneously. 
We appreciate that the results have some limitations because our model is based on 
specific assumptions, e.g., quantity competition, the linearity of functions, a three-firm 
case, and strong network externalities. In future, we intend to discuss more general 
cases by relaxing these assumptions and extending the model to oligopolistic 
competition. Furthermore, as mentioned above, we should examine the stability of the 
merger. To do so, we must consider the full merger case where the merger is composed 
of all firms existing in the market. These issues should be addressed in future research. 
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 3 
Equation (20) can be rewritten as follows. 
,
2
12
2
1
321 MMMM CSCSCSCS 

                (A.1) 
where  
    ,221 CIM qqCS                                  (A.1.1) 
    ,2 222 COIIM qqqqCS                          (A.1.2) 
      .2 2223 COIM qqqCS                           (A.1.3) 
Regarding equation (A.1), based on assumptions (ii) and (iii), it holds that .
2
1   
Substituting equations (6), (15), and (16) into equations (A.1.1), (A.1.2), and (A.1.3), 
we derive the following: 
  ,121 GqD
nCS CM
    ,222 GqD
nCS CM
  and   ,323 GqD
nCS CM
  
where  
     ,02221  D
nnnG   
           ,022222222  D
nnnnnnnG CC
                 
         .042222 223  D nnnnnG CC   
In this case, equation (A.1) can be rewritten as follows: 
  .
2
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2
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

 

  GGGq
D
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Therefore, we obtain that .)(0)(  nCSM  
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